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PLAY IT AGAIN SAMANTHA? Another
Argument for U.S. Adherence to Article 6bis of
The Berne Convention
Ain't Singin' for Miller / Don't Sing For Bud / I won't sing for politicians /
Ain't Singin' for Spuds...I
When Neil Young penned the above words to the song This
Note's For You, 2 he was chastising artists for allowing their work
to promote the advertising of such commercial products as beer,
soft drinks, athletic shoes and raisins. Although the artistic integ-
rity of such "selling out" of rock n' roll is questionable, no one
would question an artist's legal right to exploit that work.3 In fact,
the recent trend in using new and classic tracks to promote prod-
ucts has led to a resurgence of many baby boomer songs, with a
secondary effect of refurbishing many aging rockers' careers. Music
marketing has become big business. Yet, such Madison Avenue
tactics, unquestionably a highly debatable topic, is beyond the
scope of this comment. Rather, the legalities of a copyright holder,
one not the originating artist/author, who exploits that work for
profit is the focus of debate here.
If one accepts the premise that an artist who retains his copy-
right has the legal right to exploit that work in any manner, then a
corollary to that proposition would be that a copyright holder, who
may not necessarily be the originating artist, also has the exclusive
right to exploit that work. But what of the original artist who vol-
untarily (or involuntarily) surrenders some or all rights in the
work? Does that artist retain a moral right" in the fruits of his
labor to protect the integrity of the artist and the work? And what
of a work that enters the public domain upon expiration of its
copyright? What protection is afforded that work?
1. N. Young, This Note's For You.
2. Id.
3. A copyright holder's exclusive right to exploitation of the copyright is found in §
106 of The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986).
4. The concept of moral rights comes from the french le droit moral, and enjoys its
greatest acceptance in the European countries of France, Germany and Italy. See infra note
5.
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The moral rights doctrine of copyright law encompasses personal
rights of authors and artists, as opposed to their proprietary right
in the copyright.0 Generally speaking, it protects the integrity of
the author and the work.6 More specifically, moral rights include:
1) The right to be known as the author of the work;
2) The right to prevent others from being named the author of the work;
3) The right to prevent others from falsely attributing the authored work to
one who did not create it;
4) The right to prevent others from making deforming changes in the work;
5) The right to withdraw the work from distribution if it no longer repre-
sents the views of the author; and
6) The right to prevent others from using the work or author's name in such
a way as to reflect on the author professionally.
1
United States copyright law" does not recognize moral rights.9 As
a result, American courts have been forced to fashion a remedy
using a myriad of theories, 10 with the most noticeable and unique
being the use of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." The most fa-
mous case in which section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was used as a
"back door" to the assertion of moral rights is Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Companies.'2 In Gilliam, the Monty Python comedy
troupe sought a preliminary injunction to restrain the American
Broadcasting Company ("ABC") from airing certain Monty Py-
thon programs licensed to ABC by the British Broadcasting Com-
pany ("BBC"). 3 Monty Python was under agreement to the BBC
to write, deliver, and perform scripts as part of a comedy series
entitled "Monty Python's Flying Circus." Monty Python retained
all rights in the script and "optimum control" over any major
5. 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21[A], 8-247 (1987) [hereinafter NIMMER].
6. Id. These are the concepts of paternity and integrity; paternity is the right to be
known as the author of the work, while integrity encompasses the right to prevent distortion
of the work. Id.
7. Id.
8. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986).
9. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)("Ameri-
can copyright law... does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their
violation, since the law [copyright law] seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the
personal, rights of authors."). See also Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
10. Courts have used a variety of available legal theories to implicitly recognize the
substance of moral rights, such as unfair competition, defamation, invasion of privacy, and
breach of contract. See NIMMER, supra note 5, at § 8.21[E], 8-248. See also Gilliam, 538
F.2d at 24.
11. The Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1982).
12. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F.
Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
13. 538 F.2d at 18.
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changes. Under the same agreement, the BBC acquired licensing
rights, and subsequently licensed the rights to certain Monty Py-
thon segments to Time-Life Films.14 The agreement with Time-
Life permitted editing only "for insertion of commercials, applica-
ble censorship or governmental. . . rules and regulations, and Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters and time segment require-
ments." 15 ABC in turn was under agreement with Time-Life to air
two ninety minute specials of Monty Python programs.16
The first ninety minute special was aired with twenty-four min-
utes of the original ninety minutes edited out. "Appalled" at the
mutilation caused by the editing, Monty Python attempted to ne-
gotiate with ABC, and upon failure to reach an agreement, filed an
action to enjoin the broadcast of the second ninety minute special,
plus damages." The trial judge, although finding that "the plain-
tiffs have established an impairment of the integrity of their work"
and "the damage that has been caused to the plaintiffs is irrepara-
ble by its nature,"18 nonetheless denied injunctive relief. The trial
judge refused Monty Python's request for an injunction on the
grounds that the defendant ABC would be financially harmed if
enjoined from airing the program; that it was questionable who
owned the copyright to the recorded programs; that it was unclear
whether or not Time-Life and the BBC were indispensable parties;
and that the plaintiff had not pursued the matter diligently. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in granting injunc-
tive relief to the plaintiffs,20 proceeded on two theories. First of all,
the court held that unauthorized changes in an author's work
which are so extensive as to impair the integrity of the original
work constitute infringement.2' Judge Lumbard concluded that
there was a likelihood that ABC's actions constituted infringement,
as the editing was substantial and unauthorized.2 2 The court fur-
ther found that absent an express authorization of the right to
make changes, such right is reserved to the author. This applies
14. Id. at 17.
15. Id. at 17-18.




20. Id. at 26.
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 19. Judge Lumbard noted that "approximately 27 per cent of the original
program was omitted, and the editing contravened contractual provisions that limited the
right to edit Monty Python material." Id.
1989
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even if the assignment/license is silent with respect to the right to
make changes.2" Since Monty Python retained control over the
script via the scriptwriters' agreement with the BBC, the group
therefore retained control over editing of the script for the re-
corded programs. Thus, the BBC as grantor could convey to ABC
only those rights that it retained through the scriptwriters'
agreement.24
Although the court's copyright infringement theory implicitly
recognized the moral right of an author to prevent distortion or
mutilation of his work,2 5 one must not forget that the Copyright
Act affords no protection of moral rights. The court's second the-
ory of recovery, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,2 is the more cre-
ative of the two. Although the Gilliam court conceded that the
Copyright Act affords no protection of moral rights, the court fash-
ioned a unique remedy by using section 43(a) to implicitly recog-
nize the moral right of the author to have his work attributed to
him in the form in which he created it.
27
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which is the federal counter-
part to state unfair competition laws, states in part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services . . . a false designation of origin, or any false description
or representation . . . and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
23. Id. at 22.
A reading of the contract [between Monty Python and the BBC] seems to indicate
that Monty Python obtained control over editing the script only to ensure control
over the program recorded from the script. Since the scriptwriters' agreement explic-
itly retains for the group all rights not granted by contract, omission of any terms
concerning alterations in the program after recording must be read as reserving to
appellants exclusive authority for such revisions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
24. Id. at 21.
25. Id. at 23-24.
[TIhe copyright law should be used to recognize the important role of the artist in
our society and the need to encourage production and dissemination of artistic works
by providing adequate legal protection for one who submits his work to the pub-
lic. . . .[T]he cuts made constituted an actionable mutilation of Monty Python's
work.
Id. (citation omitted).
26. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1982).
27. 538 F.2d at 24. The Gilliam court rationalized that:
[Clourts have long granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist's work by relying
on theories outside the statutory law of copyright. . . . Although such decisions are
clothed in terms of proprietary right in one's creation, they also properly vindicate
the author's personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a
distorted form.
Id. (emphasis added).
commerce . . . shall be liable to a civil action by any person . . . who be-
lieves that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false
description or representation.2 8
Under section 43(a), the Gilliam court held that presentation of a
distorted work, if accompanied by the author's name, amounts to
misrepresentation that could injure an author's business or per-
sonal reputation, and thus violate section 43(a), even where no reg-
istered trademark is concerned.2" The court equated ABC's broad-
cast of the unauthorized edited version of the program as the
presentation of a distorted work. Since Monty Python's name ac-
companied the program, that presentation amounted to an action-
able misrepresentation which "impaired the integrity of appellants'
work and represented to the public as a product of appellants that
[which] was actually a mere caricature of their talents." 30 By leav-
ing Monty Python's name "affixed" to the edited version of the
program, ABC in fact created "a false designation of origin, or any
false description or representation."31 Under the Gilliam court's
analysis, the above would hold true even in light of a notice dis-
claiming the author's approval of the edited version, as a dis-
claimer is not a defense to an action under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.32
But the question still remains: Isn't the Lanham Act a trade-
mark statute, not a copyright statute? How is it that the court
uses a trademark statute to protect a common law copyright? 3
Also, since moral rights are generally recognizable through copy-
right law (outside the United States), how can it be that the court
recognizes moral rights through trademark law? Such thought pro-
voking questions were touched upon in Judge Gurfein's concur-
rence. Judge Gurfein posited that:
So far as the Lanham Act is concerned, it is not a substitute for droit moral
which authors in Europe enjoy. If the licensee may, by contract, distort the
recorded work, the Lanham Act does not come into play. If the licensee has
28. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1982).
29. 538 F.2d at 24.
30. Id. at 25.
31. Lanham Act § 43(a), supra note 28.
32. 538 F.2d at 25 n.13.
33. Since Monty Python's suit was to enjoin a future broadcast, its copyright in the
unpublished script was a common law, rather than a statutory, copyright since statutory
copyright can only exist after publication. See id. at 19-20 n.3. In his concurrence, Judge
Gurfein "believe[d] that this is the first case in which a federal appellate court has held that
there may be a violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act with respect to a common-law
copyright. The Lanham Act is a trademark statute, not a copyright statute." Id. at 26.
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no such right by contract, there will be a violation in breach of contract. 4
Judge Gurfein viewed section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as having
limited applicability. Once the court determined that the unautho-
rized edited version of the program constituted an infringement of
Monty Python's copyright, any additional theories of recovery be-
yond copyright infringement would be surplusage.3 5 According to
Judge Gurfein, an appropriate disclaimer would solve any problem
of misdescription of origin to take the case out of the realm of the
Lanham Act."'
Confused? Well, consider the case of Smith v. Montoro,s7 in
which reverse passing offP8 was considered actionable under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.89 In Smith, actor Paul Smith contracted
with an Italian film company to star in a film production. Smith
was to receive star billing in both the film credits and advertise-
ments promoting the film. The Italian film company licensed the
United States distribution rights to the defendants, who subse-
quently removed Smith's name and substituted another actor's
name in both the film credits and promotional advertisements.
Smith filed suit, and proceeded under several theories, including
violation of section 43(a).41 The court in Smith equated the unau-
thorized removal of Smith's name from the film credits and adver-
tisements with an unauthorized removal or obliteration of an origi-
nal trademark, thus constituting reverse passing off. This "reverse
passing off" created a false designation of origin and false descrip-
tion violative of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.42
Both Gilliam and Smith view the Lanham Act as remedial in
nature, and give section 43(a) a very broad interpretation. By con-
trast, the district court in Smith adopted a narrower approach and
34. Id. at 27 (emphasis in original). According to Judge Gurfein, the Lanham Act deals
with misdescription of origin, not "artistic integrity." Id.
35. Id. at 26.
36. Id. at 27. Judge Gurfein's support for a disclaimer comports with District Judge
Lasker's original grant of limited relief to Monty Python which required ABC to broadcast a
disclaimer at the beginning of the program. Id. at 18.
37. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. The concept of "reverse passing off" concerns the unauthorized removal or obliter-
ation of an original trademark on goods produced by another before resale of such goods.
See id. at 605; See also NiMmER, supra note 5, at § 8.21[E], 8-270.2.
39. 648 F.2d at 607.
40. Id. at 603.
41. Id. Plaintiff also proceeded on theories of breach of contract, false light publicity,
and violation of CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West 1982), concerning appropriation of a persons
likeness. Id.
42. Id. at 607.
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concluded "that the Lanham Act is limited in its scope and intent
to merchandising practices in the nature of, or economically
equivalent to, palming off one's goods as those of a competitor,
and-or misuse of trademarks and trade names." 3
Although the Gilliam and Smith courts' use of the Lanham Act
to protect moral rights is rather inventive, perhaps they are giving
too broad an interpretation to the statute, an interpretition not
originally contemplated by the framers of section 43(a). Nowhere
in the legislative history of section 43(a) is there any indication
that Congress intended the protection afforded both the Gilliam
and Smith plaintiffs." The reader should be reminded that the
Lanham Act is a trademark statute, used to protect trademarks
and trade names. Where are the trademarks in these cases? And
remember, as Judge Gurfein stated in his concurrence in Gilliam,
the Lanham Act is not a substitute for moral rights."5
Although use of the Lanham Act might be viewed as the most
creative and inventive method of protecting moral rights under
American law, it is by no means the sole theory courts have used to
implicitly recognize moral rights in this country. In Geisel v.
Poynter Products, Incorporated,"O the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York recognized that moral
rights could be asserted through contract law. 7 The court went on
to state that although the civil law doctrine of moral right is not
recognized by American law, parts of the doctrine exist as specific
rights, such as copyright, libel, privacy and unfair competition.8 In
Edison v. Viva International Limited,'9 the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division stated that an action for libel may exist
where an author's name is retained on a work in which the changes
43. Id. at 603 (emphasis in orginal).
44. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
1274 (1946). The senate report cites Justice Holmes in Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359
(1923):
It [a trademark] does not confer a right to prohibit the use of the word or words. It is
not a copyright. . . .A trademark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far
as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his.
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 1275 (emphasis added). The basic purpose of trademark legisla-
tion, according to the senate report, is to protect both the consumer and the trademark
owner. Id. at 1274.
45. 538 F.2d at 27.
46. 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
47. Id. See also Edison v. Viva Int'l, Ltd., 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203
(1979)(moral rights subsumed by contract law); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
48. 295 F. Supp. at 339-40 n.5.
49. 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1979).
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made are such as to reflect adversely upon the author's reputa-
tion.50 The Fifth Circuit, in Zim v. Western Publishing Com-
pany,5 recognized that it is an invasion of privacy to use an au-
thor's name on a revised version of a previously published work by
such author, if publication of the revision is unauthorized.52 And
finally, an action may lie for unfair competition whereby one
passes off the work of another as the author's own work.53 Most
actions under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act also contain an un-
fair competition claim, as section 43(a) is considered the statutory
counterpart to the common law claim of unfair competition.",
As might be evident from the above case law, the courts are si-
lently screaming out for the recognition of moral rights and are
haphazardly manipulating long recognized theories of law in an at-
tempt to fit this foreign right into the jigsaw puzzle. Unfortunately,
the piece just does not quite fit. There does not seem to be an
adequate remedy at law for the protection of moral rights, at least
not in this country. Perhaps due in part to this realization, two
states have adopted their own version of 'moral rights' legislation.
The California Art Preservation Act 55 is one such state statute.
The Act provides that "[n]o person, except an artist who owns and
possesses a work of fine art which the artist has created, shall in-
tentionally commit, or authorize the intentional commission of,
any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a
work of fine art.""6 Unfortunately, the California Act is applicable
only to works of fine art,51 and does not include works for hire.5
50. Id. at 207.
51. 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978).
52. Id. at 1326-27.
53. This is known as the concept of false attribution. See generally Granz v. Harris,
198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390
(1975).
54. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Jaeger
v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Geisel v. Poynter Prods.,
Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982). Section 987(a) states:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the physical alteration or destruction
of fine art, which is an expression of an artist's personality, is detrimental to the
artist's reputation, and artists therefore have an interest in protecting their works of
fine art against such alteration or destruction; and that there is also a public interest
in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations.
Id.
56. Id. at § 987(c)(1).
57. Id. at § 987(b)(2). "'Fine art' means an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or
an original work of art in glass, of recognized quality, but shall not include work prepared
under contract for commercial use by its purchaser." Id.
58. Id. at § 987(b)(2) & (7). Section 987(b)(7) states: " 'Commercial use' means fine art
Vol. 27:609
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Also, in most cases there must be an intentional act of defacement,
mutilation, alteration or destruction for the Act to apply.5 9
The other state statute, The New York Artists' Authorship
Rights Act,6" is similar in scope to the California Act. The New
York Act provides that:
[N]o person other than the artist or a person acting with the artists consent
shall knowingly display in a place accessible to the public or publish a work
of fine art or a limited edition multiple of not more than three hundred
copies by that artist or a reproduction thereof in an altered, defaced, muti-
lated or modified form if the work is displayed, published or reproduced as
being the work of the artist, or under circumstances under which it would
reasonably be regarded as being the work of the artist, and damage to the
artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result therefrom, except that this
section shall not apply to sequential imagery such as that in motion
pictures."
Like the California Act, the New York statute is applicable to
works of fine art.62 In addition to works of fine art, the New York
Act also protects limited edition multiples,63 but does not apply to
works for hire." Equally important is the fact that the altered
work must be attributed to the author for an action to lie under
the New York Act.65
Despite the obvious shortcomings of both state statutes, such
legislation is a step in the right direction to recognizing moral
rights under American law. Unfortunately, there exists the possi-
bility of federal preemption: the Copyright Act will preempt a
state statute if: (1) the rights created under state law are
created under a work-for-hire arrangement for use in advertising, magazines, newspapers, or
other print and electronic media." Id. (emphasis added).
59. The Act also provides that "no person who frames, conserves, or restores a work of
fine art shall commit, or authorize the commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation,
alteration or destruction of a work of fine art by any act constituting gross negligence." Id.
at § 987(c)(2) (emphasis added).
60. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AiF. § 14.03 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988).
61. Id. at § 14.03(1).
62. Id. at § 11.01. "Fine art" means a painting, sculpture, drawing, or work of graghic
art and paint, but not multiples. Id.
63. Id. at § 11.01(10). "Limited edition" means works of fine art produced from a
master, all of which are the same image and bear numbers or other markings to denote the
limited production thereof to a stated maximum number of multiples, or are otherwise held
out as limited to a maximum number of multiples. Id. The New York Act protects limited
edition multiples "of not more than three hundred copies." Id. at § 14.03(1).
64. Id. at § 14.03(3)(d). Section 14.03(3)(d) provides: "This section shall not apply to
work prepared under contract for advertising or trade use unless the contract so provides."
Id.
65. Id. at § 14.03(1).
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equivalent to rights under federal law, and (2) the rights under
state law are applicable to 'works of authorship' within the subject
matter of the Copyright Act.6 In regard to the latter element,
clearly, "works of fine art" can be considered "works of author-
ship" under the Copyright Act. Not so clear is whether or not the
first element applies to preempt the state statutes. Are the "moral
rights" created under the state acts "equivalent" to any rights cre-
ated under federal law? It is precisely this element on which rea-
sonable men could, and have, differed.
So where does all this leave us? We have a myriad of case law in
which the courts have uniquely, albeit haphazardly, attempted to
fashion a remedy to implicitly recognize an author's moral rights
using theories of law outside the realm of copyright. Yet, the un-
derlying theme is that if the United States and its judicial system
are to recognize moral rights, such moral rights should be recog-
nized through copyright law. It is ultimately up to the Congress to
lead the way in providing the necessary continuity and leadership
in the area of moral rights by passing adequate legislation. Three
avenues are open to the Congress to achieve this goal: (1) amend
the Copyright Act to provide for the protection of moral rights; (2)
adopt limited moral rights legislation; or (3) become a Berne Con-
vention member and adhere to Article 6bis.
AMEND THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Although arguably the most desirable course of action, amending
the Copyright Act to provide for protection of moral rights is per-
haps the most radical of the proposed solutions. One such amend-
ment, H.R. 288,67 was proposed by Congressman Drinan to amend
the copyright law to secure the rights of authors of pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works to prevent the distortion, mutilation,
or other alteration of such works.6 8 Unfortunately, such legislation
standing on its own has not met with much success. As will be seen
in the third proposed solution, amending the Copyright Act would
be much more successful if Congress was presented with the
proper vehicle, such as the Berne Convention, to facilitate and le-
gitimize the process.
66. See NIMMER, supra note 5, at § 8.21[C], 8-260.




ADOPT LIMITED MORAL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
A second course of action available to Congress would be to
adopt limited moral rights legislation. One such 'moral rights' bill,
The Film Integrity Act of 1987,69 was introduced by Congressman
Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri on May 13, 1987. This bill "gives
the screenwriter and director of a film the right of consent for any
alteration of their work."'70 The bill was Gephardt's reaction to the
recent colorization of many American Film Classics,71 and perhaps,
was foresight to the subsequent actions of the Copyright Office in
granting copyright protection for colorized versions of black and
white motion pictures.71 On June 22, 1987, the Copyright Office of
the Library of Congress issued a notice of registration decision
which granted derivative78 protection to "those color versions that
reveal a certain minimum amount of individual creative human au-
thorship. '74 The Copyright Office made this decision disregarding
any "aesthetic or moral arguments.
1 75
Whether or not a colorized version of a black and white film
should receive copyright protection as a derivative work is beyond
the scope of this comment. Suffice it to say that regardless of the
Copyright Office's decision, many proponents of the Gephardt Bill
and like legislation 76 view the colorization process as the 'bastardi-
69. H.R. 2400, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. E1922-23 (daily ed. May 13,
1987).
70. Id. at E1922.
71. Id.
72. Copyright Registration For Colorized Version of Black and White Motion Pictures,
52 Fed. Reg. 23443-46 (1987).
73. Section 101 of The Copyright Act of 1976 defines derivative work as:
[A] work based upon one or more pre-existing works such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording,
art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annota-
tions, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original
work of authorship....
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977 & Supp. 1986). Section 103(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976 outlines
the scope of derivative protection:
[Copyright protection in a derivative work] extends only to the material contributed
by the author of such work, as distinguished from the pre-existing material employed
in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the pre-existing material. The
copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope,
duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the pre-existing
material.
Id. at § 103(b).
74. 52 Fed. Reg. at 23445.
75. Id. at 23444 n.2.
76. People the likes of Martin Scorsese, George Lucas, Stephen Speilberg and Arthur
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zation' of American Film Classics and the rape and plunder of a
very important part of our heritage."
The Gephardt Bill, as a limited moral rights bill in direct re-
sponse to the colorization of black and white films, is understanda-
bly limited to the protection of one artistic medium-film; there-
fore, it falls short of being a broad sweeping piece of moral rights
legislation. If Congress where to adopt this course of action, it
might find itself considering a huge volume of legislation each time
a specific work or artistic medium is threatened. Different bills
would have to be tailor made to fit the specific fact, work and me-
dium in question.
BECOME A BERNE MEMBER AND ADHERE TO ARTICLE 6BIS
While Congress has recently passed Berne Convention7" imple-
menting legislation,79 it has done so in complete disregard of Arti-
Hiller have spoken out publicly and at congressional hearings against the colorization of
black and white films.
77. According to Representative Gephardt, "[f]ilm is a uniquely American art form:
we brought it to life, we made it talk, we used it to address our deepest social concerns.
Classic Feature Films are a vital part of America's living heritage." 133 Cong. Rec. at E1923
(daily ed. May 13, 1987).
78. International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed at
Berne, September 9, 1886; Additional Act and Declaration signed at Paris, May 4, 1896;
revised at Berlin, November 13, 1908; additional protocol signed at Berne, March 20, 1914;
revised at Rome, June 2, 1928; revised at Brussels, June 26, 1948; revised at Stockholm, July
14, 1967 (but not ratified by a sufficient number of member states to bring the Stockholm
Act into force); revised at Paris, July 24, 1971. For text of the most recent Paris Act, see 4
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, Appendix 27 (1987) [hereinafter The Berne
Convention].
79. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987, H.R. 1623, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. H1293 (daily ed. March 16, 1987), was first introduced in the House by
Congressman Kastenmeier of Wisconsin on March 16, 1987. Id. Mr. Kastenmeier's bill origi-
nally contained a moral rights provision which called for adding a new section to the Copy-
right Act, § 106a, the "moral rights of the author" section. Id. at H1295. After much debate
in committee hearings between directors and screenwriters on the one hand, and the various
copyright industries on the other, the House opted to pass an amended version of H.R. 1623
(now referred to as H.R. 4262, The Berne Implementation Act of 1988) without the moral
rights provision. 134 Cong. Rec. at H3103 (1988). The amended House Bill passed by a 420-
0 margin. Id. In the debate preceding the vote, Congressman Kastenmeier stated:
After hearing from all these parties, I came to respect the view that the best course
was to avoid statutory treatment of moral rights in the context of Berne. This conclu-
sion rested in part on the political reality that legislation with a moral rights provi-
sion simply would not pass. Furthermore, amendments to the Copyright Act are not
required in order to secure U.S. adherence to Berne. Most observers agree that cur-
rent law, including the Lanham Act and laws relating to defamation, privacy and
publicity, and unfair competition, contains the basic element of moral rights suffi-
cient to comply with Berne.
Id. at H3083. In its place, the amended House Bill substituted § 4(b)(1)(2) which promised
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cle 6bis,80 the moral rights provision of Berne, thus making United
States adherence to Berne "moral rights neutral."' The Berne
Convention is the first international treaty governing the protec-
tion of intellectual property. The crux of the Berne Convention is
two-fold:
(1) National Treatment - agreement to protect foreign copyrighted works at
no less a level than one's own; and
(2) Minimum Mandatory Rights - foreign copyright owners must receive a
minimum level of protection in each Berne country regardless of the protec-
tion afforded one's own nationals.
8 2
Prior to Congress' enactment of the Berne Implementation Act,
the United States was signatory to the Universal Copyright Con-
vention ("UCC")8s  but was not a member of Berne."' Notwith-
standing the United States, seventy-six countries are Berne mem-
bers, as opposed to seventy-nine UCC members. Fifty-two
countries are members of both conventions, while twenty-four
not to "expand or reduce" existing moral rights protection. Id. at H3080. On October 5,
1988, the Senate, by a 90-0 margin, passed an amended version of H.R. 4262, which con-
tained minor technical changes. S. 1301 (as amended), 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong. Rec.
S14549, S14566 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988). The Senate Bill also deleted the original moral
rights provision and in its place retained § 4(b)(1)(2) (numbered 3(b)(1)(2)) which also
promised not to "expand or reduce" existing moral rights protection. Id. at S14549. The
House concurred in the Senate amendment on October 12, 1988. 134 Cong. Rec. at H10098
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988). Senate ratification of the treaty occurred on Thursday, October 20,
1988, 134 Cong. Rec. at S16939 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988), with the bill being sent to the
President for his approval and signature the very next day. 134 Cong. Rec. at H11275 (daily
ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
80. Berne Convention, Art. 6bis (Paris Act) states in part:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Id. See 4 M. NiMMER, NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, Appendix 27-5, 6 (1987).
81. Senator Hatch of Utah, conferring on the provision of the Senate Bill which would
neither "expand or reduce" existing copyright protection of moral rights, stated in debate
that "U.S. implementing legislation should be neutral on the issue of moral rights," and "it
is my belief that Berne under our bill will be moral rights neutral." 134 Cong. Rec. at
S14558 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988).
82. Smith, Should the Motion Picture Industry Support or Oppose U.S. Adherence
to the Berne Convention?, 6 THE ENT. AND SPORTS LAW. 1, 10 (Fall 1987) [hereinafter
Smith].
83. Uniform Copyright Convention, signed at Geneva, September 6, 1952; revised at
Paris, July 24, 1971. For text of the Paris Act, see 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
Appendix 25 (1988) (hereinafter the UCC).
84. The other noticeable exception to Berne membership is the Soviet Union, which,
like the United States, is a UCC member. The Peoples Republic of China is neither a Berne
nor a UCC member.
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countries are Berne signatories but not UCC members."s This last
fact is significant because works first published in the United
States by an American author were not protected in those twenty-
four countries who are Berne members but not UCC signatories.
The significance of United States adherence to Berne should not
be understated. In the first place, adherence to Berne will allow
the United States to dispense with the device of simultaneous pub-
lication. The only way that the United States or any other non-
Berne country could gain Berne protection for a copyright was to
either first publish that work in a Berne country, or publish the
work in a Berne country simultaneously with publishing the work
in the non-Berne country, such as the United States. 6 This will
result in a significant savings in both cost and time, not to mention
litigation for infringement. Secondly, United States adherence to
Berne will afford protection against works frequently pirated in
those twenty-four countries who are Berne members but not UCC
members.8 7 Third, Berne membership will provide the United
States with greater market access and better trade relations in the
intellectual property arena, specifically in those twenty-four Berne
member countries who are not UCC members." Fourth, United
States adherence might result in retroactive protection of certain
United States works created prior to United States adherence.8 9
Lastly, Berne membership will elevate the United States to the
forefront of the International Copyright Community as a leader in
the protection of intellectual property.90
Purposely left out as a distinct benefit of Berne membership is
the protection of moral rights. Article 6bis of the Berne Conven-
tion states that: "Independently of the author's economic rights,
the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and
to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation."91 Yet, Congress has
opted to forgo a golden opportunity to once and for all settle the
moral rights debate in this country by passing Berne implementing
85. See Smith, supra note 82, at 10.
86. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.04[D], 17-13 (1988).
87. Pirating of United States works has been most prevalent in Turkey and Thailand,
both of which are Berne members but not UCC members. See Smith, supra note 81, at 11-
12.
88. Id. at 12-13.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Berne Convention, Art. 6bis (Paris Act).
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legislation without the appropriate moral rights legislation needed
to adhere to Article 6bis. Since Congress first determined that
Berne was not a self-executing treaty,92 appropriate implementing
legislation was necessary. Congress then determined that amending
the Copyright Act to provide for Berne adherence would be the
best course of action to pursue in accomplishing this goal.93 Thus,
Congress had before it the perfect vehicle, the Berne Convention,
to use in amending the Copyright Act to provide for the recogni-
tion of moral rights in compliance with Article 6bis. Instead, Con-
gress decided to forgo the moral rights issue for another day. "
It is interesting to note that for years the courts have been say-
ing that United States law does not recognize the concept of droit
moral. Opponents of Berne in the past (most noticeably Congress
and the copyright community) have previously defeated prior
Berne implementing legislation in part on the premise that United
States law is incompatible with Article 6bis of Berne.9 5 Now,
within the span of approximately eighteen months, Congress has
decided to ignore years of settled law and scholarly opinion by
stating that United States law adequately protects and recognizes
moral rights, and is therefore not incompatible with Article 6bis.9 e
It is rather evident the influence big business and the copyright
industries have had on Congress to block the moral rights legisla-
tion needed to adhere to Article 6bis. In fact, Senator Hatch is on
record as stating the influence this lobby had on the final outcome
92. Congressman Kastenmeier, introducing the Berne Convention Implementation Act
of 1987, stated that "[tihe proposed legislation clearly proceeds upon the presumption that
the Berne Convention is not self-executing and requires implementing legislation." 133
Cong. Rec. at H1294 (daily ed. March 16, 1987) (emphasis added). The bill's co-sponsor,
Congressman Moorhead stated that "[w]ith regard to moral rights, the subcommittee has
received testimony from many experts including representatives of 11 countries who are
members of Berne and their opinions are almost unanimous, in th[at] Berne is not self-
executing .. " 134 Cong. Rec. at H3083 (daily ed. May 10, 1988)(emphasis added).
93. 133 Cong. Rec. H1293 (daily ed. March 16, 1987).
94. The congressional attitude towards the protection of moral rights can be summed
up neatly in the words of Congressman Moorhead: "The Congress can adopt legislation
changing the law regarding moral rights, but it can do that at any time, regardless of
whether or not the United States adheres to Berne." 134 Cong. Rec. at H3Q83 (daily ed.
May 10, 1988). This statement begs the question; if Congress was truly serious about moral
rights legislation, it would recognize that Article 6bis is the appropriate vehicle for that
legislation.
95. 133 Cong. Rec. at H1293 (daily ed. March 16, 1987).
96. The conflict between settled case law and Congress' new found view on moral
rights is best exemplified by Senator Hatch's statement that "while existing U.S. law satis-
fies U.S. obligations under Article 6bis of Berne, our judicial system has consistently re-
jected causes of action denominated as 'moral rights' or arising under the moral rights doc-




The Coalition to Preserve the American Copyright Tradition and the Maga-
zine Publishers Association, which originally opposed Berne due to a con-
cern over moral rights, helped craft the compromise [making Berne moral
rights neutral] and now feel comfortable enough about United States adher-
ence to Berne to no longer oppose S. 1301 [the Senate amendment to H.R.
4262].-1
In order to rush through a compromise bill,98 Congress has
bowed to the pressures of special interests and has effectively
painted a coat of grey on the moral rights of artists and authors in
this country. In the words of Senator Hatch, "[m]oral rights will
not come in, if you will, the back door by virtue of our adherence
to Berne." Congress has not only closed the back door to moral
rights, it has chained and bolted that very same door.
For the time being, we will have to settle for piecemeal legisla-
tion such as the Film Integrity Act of 1987 in the area of moral
rights. It is now up to the courts to take charge of the moral rights
debate and hold that United States law is incompatible with Arti-
cle 6bis of Berne, forcing a showdown in the moral rights arena. As
Representative Gephardt stated in the introduction to the Film In-
tegrity Act of 1987, it is time to "hold[] those who would tamper
with our American heritage to a higher standard than a mere dol-
lar sign. We must insist on nothing less."99
Brian E. Koeberle
97. 134 Cong. Rec. at S14558 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988).
98. Senator Hatch stated: "Thus, to maintain th[e] status quo on moral rights, the
compromise [bill]" made changes to assure that Berne adherence would be moral rights
neutral. Id.
99. 133 Cong. Rec. at E1922-23 (daily ed. May 13, 1987).
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